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I. INTRODUCTION 
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 In this action seven plaintiff States (“the States”) sought 
to recover proceeds of matured but unredeemed United States 
savings bonds from the United States Treasury (“the 
Treasury”).1  In addition to the Treasury, the States also named 
other United States Government entities and officials in their 
official capacities as defendants and we refer to all the 
defendants collectively as the “Government” or “Federal 
Government.”  The States asserted that the Treasury has 
possession of approximately $16 billion worth of matured but 
unredeemed savings bonds, of which persons whose last known 
addresses were within the plaintiff States own $1.6 billion.  The 
States contended that their respective unclaimed property acts 
obliged the Treasury to account for and deliver the proceeds of 
these bonds to the States for reunification with their owners.  
The Government moved to dismiss the case and the District 
Court granted its motion as it concluded that the Government‟s 
sovereign immunity and intergovernmental immunity barred the 
action and that federal law and regulations preempted the States‟ 
statutory authority to obtain the proceeds of the savings bonds.  
Six of the States appealed.  Though we do not agree with the 
District Court with respect to the application of sovereign 
immunity, we do agree with its other conclusions and therefore 
we will affirm. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 A. The United States Savings Bond Program 
                                                 
1
 Throughout this opinion we refer to the plaintiffs in this action 
as “States” but to the 50 states as a whole as “states.” 
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 Pursuant to its constitutional power “to borrow money on 
the credit of the United States,” Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 
666-67, 82 S.Ct. 1089, 1092 (1962) (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 
8, cl. 2), Congress delegated authority to the Secretary of the 
Treasury (“the Secretary”), with the approval of the President, to 
issue savings bonds “for expenditures authorized by law.”  31 
U.S.C. § 3105(a).
2
  The Government sold savings bonds, 
originally called liberty bonds, “[t]o obtain money for the United 
States Government . . . [and] to encourage thrift and savings by 
small investors.”  Moore‟s Adm‟r v. Marshall, 196 S.W.2d 369, 
372 (Ky. 1946).   A United States savings bond is a contract 
between the United States and the bond‟s owner.  Rotman v. 
United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 724, 725 (Fed. Cl. 1994).  The 
Secretary may establish the terms and conditions that govern the 
savings bond program, a power that includes the authority to fix 
the bonds‟ investment yield, to promulgate terms and conditions 
providing that bondholders may keep the bonds beyond the date 
of their maturity, and to place conditions on transfer and 
redemption of the bonds and their sales prices.  31 U.S.C. § 
3105(b)-(c).  Most of the bonds that are the subject matter of 
this case are Series E bonds issued between 1941 and 1980.  The 
Government sold the Series E bonds at a discount and paid 
interest on them only at maturity; according to the States, after 
maturity interest stopped accruing on the bonds.
3
  The last Series 
                                                 
2
 This statute previously was codified at 31 U.S.C. § 757c(a).  
See Free, 369 U.S. at 666-67, 82 S.Ct. at 1092.   
3
 The plaintiff States‟ representation that interest ceased to 
accrue on Series E bonds after maturity may be somewhat 
misleading but we will accept it in adjudicating this appeal.  The 
reason we think that this representation may be misleading is 
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E bonds matured in 2011.   
 Pursuant to his statutory authority, the Secretary has 
promulgated various regulations governing the savings bond 
program that the Supreme Court has held preempt conflicting 
state law.  See United States v. Chandler, 410 U.S. 257, 262, 93 
S.Ct. 880, 883 (1973) (citing Free 369 U.S. at 668, 82 S.Ct. at 
1093) (“[A]bsent fraud, the regulations creating a right of 
survivorship in United States Savings Bonds . . . pre-empt[] any 
inconsistent state property law.”).  In contrast to many other 
types of securities, “[s]avings bonds are not transferable and are 
                                                                                                             
that 31 U.S.C. § 3105(b)(2)(A) indicates that the Secretary may 
prescribe regulations that provide for savings bonds to continue 
to earn interest during “a period beyond maturity.”  Moreover, 
31 C.F.R. § 315.30 provides that “[a]ll Series E bonds and 
savings notes have been extended and continue to earn interest 
until their final maturity dates, unless redeemed earlier.”  The 
regulations allow for such an “extended maturity period,” a 
“period after the original maturity date during which the owner 
may retain a bond and continue to earn interest on the maturity 
value” of the bond.  31 C.F.R. § 315.2(c). We see little 
difference between a bond paying interest accrued beyond 
maturity and extending a bond‟s maturity date for a period 
during which the bond earns interest.    Indeed, it appears that 
when this action was commenced in 2004 some Series E bonds 
had passed their original maturity dates but were continuing to 
earn interest as their maturity dates had been extended.  See 31 
C.F.R. § 316.8.  Obviously, if interest runs after the bonds‟ 
original maturity dates, the States‟ case, if affected at all, only 
could be weaker. 
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payable only to the owners named on the bonds, except as 
specifically provided in [the federal] regulations and then only 
in the manner and to the extent so provided.”  31 C.F.R. §§ 
315.15, 353.15.   
 There are limited exceptions to the general rule 
precluding the transfer of savings bonds, including cases in 
which a third party attains an interest in a bond through valid 
judicial proceedings.  31 C.F.R. §§ 315.20(b), 353.20(b).
4
  As 
                                                 
4
 31 C.F.R. § 315.39(a) and (b) provide for payment of series A, 
B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J, and K bonds, and 31 C.F.R. § 353.39(a) 
provides for payment of series EE bonds.  The regulations 
contain identical language:   
 
The Department of the Treasury will recognize a 
claim against an owner of a savings bond and 
conflicting claims of ownership of, or interest in, 
a bond between coowners or between the 
registered owner and the beneficiary, if 
established by valid, judicial proceedings, but 
only as specifically provided in this Subpart.  
Section 315.23 [or section 353.23] specifies the 
evidence required to establish the validity of the 
judicial proceedings.  
 
31 C.F.R. §§ 315.20(b), 353.20(b).  31 C.F.R. § 315.23 requires 
“that certified copies of the final judgment, decree, or court 
order, and of any necessary supplementary proceedings,” be 
submitted to establish the validity of judicial proceedings, and 
also makes provisions for payment to certain bankruptcy trustees 
  9 
will be seen below, it is highly significant that the regulations do 
not impose any time limits for bond owners to redeem the 
savings bonds, at least with respect to the bonds that are the 
subject matter of this case.  Consequently, their owners can 
present them for payment to an authorized agent of the United 
States at any time.  See 31 U.S.C. § 3105(b)(2)(A) (authorizing 
the Secretary to promulgate regulations providing that “owners 
of savings bonds may keep the bonds after maturity”).  Though 
it might be thought unlikely that an owner would present a long-
matured savings bond for redemption, the record shows that the 
Treasury as of 1989 was receiving claims of $7,000 to $10,000 a 
day for payment on savings bonds that had matured many years 
earlier.  App. at 169.
5
  As relevant here, a registered owner of a 
bond is presumed conclusively to be its owner absent errors in 
registration.  31 C.F.R. §§ 315.5, 353.5.   
 The redemption process is not complex, as the owner of a 
bond seeking to redeem it need only present the bond to an 
authorized payment agent for redemption, 31 C.F.R. §§ 
315.39(a), 353.39(a), establish his identity, sign the request for 
payment, and provide his address.  The agent then may pay the 
bond with a check drawn against funds of the United States.  
                                                                                                             
and receivers.  
 
5
 We note that the States in their complaint assert that “[n]ot 
surprisingly, Treasury has not been approached by owners in 
significant numbers seeking long-matured savings bonds.”  We 
cannot reconcile this allegation with the evidence in the record 
to which we have referred. 
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See 31 C.F.R. §§ 315.38, 353.38.  Payment agents, ordinarily 
banks, are financial institutions qualified under Treasury 
regulations to pay sums due on savings bonds.  See 31 C.F.R. §§ 
315.2(j), 353.2(f).  The relevant statutes and regulations do not 
contain provisions for locating owners of matured but 
unredeemed bonds.  In 2000, the Treasury, however, created a 
“Treasury Hunt” Internet website, which provides information 
on matured but unredeemed Series E bonds issued after 1974 in 
a database searchable by Social Security Number.
6
    
 B. The States‟ Unclaimed Property Acts 
 All of the plaintiff States have enacted unclaimed 
property acts, most of which they have based on some version of 
the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, which is rooted in the 
common-law doctrine of escheat.  See Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 547, 68 S.Ct. 682, 686 (1948) (“The 
right of appropriation by the state of abandoned property has 
existed for centuries in the common law.”).  The plaintiff-
appellant States of New Jersey, Kentucky, Montana, Oklahoma, 
Missouri and Pennsylvania claim that the unclaimed bonds are 
property of their residents within the meaning of their respective 
unclaimed property acts.  See New Jersey Uniform Unclaimed 
Property Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:30B-1 et seq. (West 2003); 
Kentucky statutes regarding descent, wills and the 
administration of decedents‟ estates, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
                                                 
6
 The website is available at Treasury Hunt, 
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/tools/tools_treasuryhunt.ht
m.   
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393.010 et seq. (West 2012); Montana Uniform Unclaimed 
Property Act, Mont. Code Ann. § 70-9-801 et seq. (2012); 
Oklahoma Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 60, 
§ 651 et seq. (2012); Missouri Uniform Disposition of 
Unclaimed Property Act, Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 447.500 et seq. 
(West 2012); Pennsylvania statutes regarding disposition of 
abandoned and unclaimed Property, 72 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1301.9 
et seq. (West 1995).  The States‟ unclaimed property acts require 
that, after time periods that differ from State to State, holders of 
unclaimed property turn the property over to the State for 
safekeeping though the original property owner retains the right 
to recover the proceeds of the property.  See, e.g., N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 46:30B-7 (“Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, 
all property . . . that is held . . . and has remained unclaimed by 
the owner for more than three years after it became payable or 
distributable is presumed abandoned.”). 
 The unclaimed property acts at issue in this case are 
“custody” escheat statutes rather than “title” escheat statutes in 
that under them the State does not take title to abandoned 
property, but, instead, obtains its custody and beneficial use 
pending identification of the property owner.
7
  Thus “[t]he 
                                                 
7
 According to the plaintiff States, “statutes that transfer title 
[are] an obsolescent form of escheat no longer in force in any 
state.”  Appellants‟ br. at 3.  We have some question as to 
whether this statement may be overbroad as it is difficult to 
understand how there can be an escheat of real or tangible 
personal property without a transfer of title, inasmuch as a state 
to dispose of such property ordinarily would need to sell it to a 
purchaser who would want title to the property.  We, however, 
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presumption of abandonment raised by the statute is rebuttable 
at any time.”  John V. Orth, Escheat: Is the State the Last Heir?, 
13 Green Bag 2d 73, 82 (2009).  Although “[t]he practical 
reason behind the states‟ action is to prevent unclaimed personal 
property being eventually appropriated by the present holder,” 
the state being “better able to provide long-term . . . custody” of 
the property, “it is sometimes admitted that the statutes are also 
a means of raising revenue.”  Id. at 78 (citing, e.g., Louisiana 
Health Serv. & Indem. Co. v. McNamara, 561 So. 2d 712, 716 
(La. 1990)) (“Although one purpose of such acts is to protect the 
missing owners, the primary rationale behind this legislation is 
its use as a revenue raising device.”); see, e.g., Clymer v. 
Summit Bancorp., 792 A.2d 396, 400 (N.J. 2002) (noting that 
75% of the funds that New Jersey collects under its Uniform 
Unclaimed Property Act are transferred to the General State 
Fund, and the State “has full use” of the money “until the 
rightful owner comes forward to claim it”).  Accordingly, 
                                                                                                             
consider that an inquiry into the accuracy of the States‟ 
representation would be beyond the scope of this opinion and so 
do not make it.  We recently described the New Jersey 
Unclaimed Property Act in American Express Travel Related 
Services, Inc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 2012), 
in which we upheld a New Jersey statute that reduced the period 
after which travelers checks are presumed abandoned from 15 
years to three years.  Id. at 364.  We indicated that after a 
transfer of abandoned property to the State of New Jersey it 
holds the property for the benefit of its owner in perpetuity.  Id. 
at 365.  Though American Express is an informative case with 
respect to the New Jersey act it does not address issues similar to 
those here.  
  13 
though the States contend that their intent in bringing this action 
has been benevolent, the objective reality obviously is 
otherwise.  The truth is that this case is a dispute between the 
States and the United States as to whether a State or the United 
States will obtain the benefit of having custody of and 
availability for use of the proceeds of the matured but 
unredeemed bonds even if it does not obtain title to the proceeds 
of the bonds or title to the bonds themselves.   
 The unclaimed property acts contain specific provisions 
for presuming property to be “abandoned” when the United 
States either holds the property or is obligated to make payment 
for it to its owner.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:30B-41.2 
(presuming property to be abandoned if unclaimed for more than 
one year after it became payable by “the executive, legislative, 
or judicial branch of the United States Government”); Okla. 
Stat. tit. 60, § 657 (property held by a state or other government 
presumed abandoned after being unclaimed for one year); Ky. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 393.068(1) (property held by Federal 
Government presumed abandoned if it remains unclaimed for 
more than five years); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 447.532(2) (property 
held by any agency or department of the United States deemed 
abandoned if unclaimed for more than three years); Mont. Code 
Ann. § 70-9-803(1)(k) (property held by a government or 
governmental subdivision unclaimed one year after it becomes 
distributable presumed abandoned); 72 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1301.9 
(any property held for its owner by any “instrumentality of the 
United States” unclaimed for five years from the date it first 
became demandable or distributable presumed abandoned). 
 C. The States‟ Efforts to Claim Proceeds of Matured 
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  but Unredeemed Savings Bonds 
 Over the last several decades, various states have sought 
to recover the proceeds from matured but unredeemed savings 
bonds.  On February 27, 1952, the Treasury issued a bulletin 
reprinting a letter dated January 28, 1952, from the Secretary to 
the Comptroller of the State of New York in response to the 
Comptroller‟s inquiry regarding “the prospective right of the 
state of New York . . . to receive payment of certain United 
States securities of which it is not the registered owner.”  App. 
at 134.  The Secretary explained that the Federal Government 
would pay the proceeds of savings bonds to the State of New 
York if it actually obtained title to the bonds, but would not do 
so where the State merely obtained a right to the custody of the 
proceeds.  The Secretary made this distinction because he 
believed that the effect of applying a custody-based escheat 
statute to savings bonds would 
either provide the obligor with a discharge, valid 
within and without New York, or fail to provide 
such discharge.  If the discharge is provided in the 
case of the ordinary debtor, then the other party to 
the contract has substituted for his right to pursue 
his obligor in any jurisdiction, a right merely to 
prosecute a claim against the State Comptroller of 
New York; if an effective discharge is not 
provided, the obligor is subject to suit outside the 
State of New York and the necessity of making 
double payment — in exchange he has a right to 
claim relief from the Comptroller under . . .  [New 
York‟s] Abandoned Property Law. 
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Id. at 135.  The Secretary concluded that “[n]either of these 
possible alterations of [the] contract [created by the savings 
bond] is contemplated in the agreement by which the United 
States pledges its faith on its securities,” because “the rights and 
duties of the United States are governed by federal rather than 
local law.”   Id. at 135-36.   
 To the best of our knowledge the Treasury last articulated 
its position with respect to the application of state escheat laws 
on savings bonds or their proceeds in 2000 on its Internet 
website, “EE/E Savings Bonds FAQs” (frequently asked 
questions).  In particular, the Treasury posted an answer to the 
question: “In a state that has a permanent escheatment law, can 
the state claim the money represented by securities that the state 
has in its possession.  For example, can a state cash savings 
bonds that it‟s gotten from abandoned safe deposit boxes?”  The 
plaintiff States refer to the Treasury‟s answer to this question — 
which is consistent with the bulletin that the Treasury issued 
almost one half of a century earlier and that we have quoted — 
as the “Escheat Decision.”  The Escheat Decision answered that: 
 The Department of the Treasury will 
recognize claims by States for payment of United 
States securities where the States have succeeded 
to the title and ownership of the securities 
pursuant to valid escheat proceedings. The 
Department, however, does not recognize claims 
for payment by a State acting merely as custodian 
of unclaimed or abandoned securities and not as 
successor in title and ownership of the securities.  
  16 
 In other words, the Treasury recognizes 
escheat statutes that provide that a State has 
succeeded to the legal ownership of securities 
because in such case payment of the securities 
results in full discharge of the Treasury‟s 
obligation and this discharge is valid in all 
jurisdictions.  
 But, payment of securities to a State 
claiming only as a custodian results in the 
substitution of one obligor, the Department of the 
Treasury, for another, the State.  Not only is there 
serious question whether there is authority for a 
State to effect such a substitution, but also there 
seems to be no basis for believing that payment to 
a State custodian would discharge Treasury of its 
obligation.  Even if the discharge were claimed 
effective in the State to which the payment is 
made, it is believed that the Treasury‟s obligation 
and liability would still remain in force in all 
other jurisdictions.
8
  
In the District Court, the parties stipulated that the Escheat 
Decision “is defendants‟ interpretation of federal savings bond 
                                                 
8
 The Escheat Decision took this statement nearly verbatim from 
a 1983 letter from the Treasury to the State of Kentucky.  See 
app. at 139.  The Escheat Decision is available at 
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/research/indepth/ebonds/res
_e_bonds_eefaq.htm. 
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regulations . . . and reflects defendants‟ understanding of 
existing laws” and that “the Department has no intention of 
deviating from the statement.”  Id. at 142.  The Treasury, 
however, has not adopted the Escheat Decision as a rule in 
accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 
U.S.C. § 551 et seq.   
 D. Procedural History 
 The Treasurer of the State of New Jersey filed this action 
on September 8, 2004, against the Treasury, the Secretary, the 
Bureau of Public Debt,
9
 and the Commissioner of the Bureau of 
Public Debt under the New Jersey Uniform Unclaimed Property 
Act.  The Treasurer of the State of North Carolina joined the 
action shortly thereafter.
10
  The plaintiff States sought an order 
directing the Government to pay the proceeds of matured but 
unredeemed savings bonds to the plaintiff States according to 
the last known addresses of their owners and for an accounting 
of the amounts owed pursuant to their unclaimed property acts.  
It was and remains clear that if the unclaimed property acts are 
applied as written, by their terms they would entitle the States to 
substantially the relief that they seek in this action.  
Nevertheless, on February 5, 2005, the Government moved to 
dismiss or transfer the action to the United States Court of 
Federal Claims as it contended that only that court had subject 
                                                 
9
 The Bureau of Public Debt is the division of the Treasury 
responsible for administrating the savings bond program. 
 
10
 North Carolina has not joined in this appeal.  See app. at 1 
(notice of appeal). 
  18 
matter jurisdiction.  In making this motion the Government 
contended that the only applicable waiver of sovereign 
immunity that would permit this action to proceed was within 
the Tucker Act, which grants the Court of Federal Claims 
jurisdiction over “any claim against the United States founded 
either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any 
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or 
implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or 
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1491(a)(1).  The District Court agreed with the Government 
with respect to the court that should entertain the action as it 
transferred the case to the Court of Federal Claims in July of 
2005 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 as it held that the States‟ 
claims were “based on contracts” — the savings bonds.  The 
States appealed from the order for transfer to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the court with 
jurisdiction to entertain appeals from the Court of Federal 
Claims as the transferee court, rather than to this Court.  See 
Carteret Sav. Bank v. Shushan, 919 F.2d 225, 228 (3d Cir. 
1990).   
 On June 15, 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit held that the Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction 
over this case and the court of appeals accordingly remanded the 
case to the District Court for further proceedings.  See 
McCormac v. U.S. Dep‟t of Treasury, 185 F. App‟x 954 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006).  In briefs filed in the court of appeals, the United 
States acknowledged that it had erred in requesting the transfer 
and conceded that the case was not within the limited 
jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.  The court of 
appeals wrote that the Court of Federal Claims did not have 
  19 
jurisdiction because the States “do not assert a contractual 
relationship . . . that provides a substantive right to money 
damages.”  Id. at 955.  Accordingly, “although the States [were] 
asserting a claim that involves a contract, they [were] not 
asserting a contract claim for money damages against the 
government.”  Id. at 956.  Moreover “[t]he States [were] not 
named parties to the bond contract, [and thus there was not] 
privity between the States and the Government.”  Id.  The court 
of appeals noted that the States, by operation of their unclaimed 
property acts, sought to act only as conservators, not as parties to 
any contracts.  Id.  
 After the return of the case to the District Court the 
plaintiff States amended their complaint multiple times to add as 
plaintiffs officials of the States of Montana, Kentucky, 
Oklahoma, Missouri, and Pennsylvania, and to add claims that 
the Escheat Decision violated the Tenth Amendment
11
 and the 
notice and comment provisions of the APA contained in 5 
U.S.C. § 553.
12
  In November of 2008, the Government filed a 
                                                 
11
 The Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.” 
 
12
 5 U.S.C. § 553 provides in relevant part: 
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motion to dismiss the fourth amended complaint, again 
contending that the District Court did not have jurisdiction but 
this time predicating that contention on an argument that the 
                                                                                                             
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall 
be published in the Federal Register, unless 
persons subject thereto are named and either 
personally served or otherwise have actual notice 
thereof in accordance with law. . . .  
 
Except when notice or hearing is required by 
statute, this subsection does not apply—  
 
 (A) to interpretative rules, general 
statements of policy, or rules of  agency 
organization, procedure, or practice; or  
 
 (B) when the agency for good cause finds 
(and incorporates the finding and a brief statement 
of reasons therefor in the rules issued)  that 
notice and public procedure thereon are 
impracticable,  unnecessary, or contrary to 
the public interest.  
 
(c) After notice required by this section, the 
agency shall give interested persons an 
opportunity to participate in the rule making 
through submission of written data, views, or 
arguments with or without opportunity for oral 
presentation. . . . 
 
  21 
United States had not waived sovereign immunity and thus the 
Federal Government could not be made a defendant in this 
action.  The Government, however, did not contend that even if 
it did not enjoy sovereign immunity in this case the Court still 
would not have statutory jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or 
any other statute.  In the alternative, the Government sought 
summary judgment on the grounds of intergovernmental 
immunity and federal preemption of the States‟ unclaimed 
property acts.   
 After oral argument, the District Court denied the 
Government‟s motion without prejudice, but granted it leave to 
file a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b).  In July of 2009, the Government filed the 
ultimately successful motion to dismiss and obtained the order 
that the States challenge on this appeal.
13
   The Government 
argued that dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was warranted 
under Rule 12(b)(1) because the States had not established that 
the Government had waived sovereign immunity.  Alternatively, 
the Government argued that dismissal was appropriate under 
Rule 12(b)(6) because federal law preempted the States‟ 
                                                 
13
 The Government addressed its motion to dismiss to the fourth 
amended complaint but after oral argument on the motion the 
States sought leave to amend the complaint to add the Treasurer 
of Pennsylvania as a plaintiff.  The Government consented to the 
amendment, thus generating a fifth amended complaint.  
Because the fifth amended complaint was substantially the same 
as the fourth amended complaint, the District Court‟s opinion 
referenced the fourth amended complaint. 
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unclaimed property acts to the extent that the States sought to 
apply those acts in this case.  The Government also contended 
that the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity barred the 
States‟ case and the case lacked merit insofar as the States based 
their claims on the Tenth Amendment and violations of the 
APA‟s notice and comment provisions.   
 The District Court began its analysis with the 
Government‟s arguments on the merits under Rule 12(b)(6) even 
though “Article III [of the Constitution] generally requires a 
federal court to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the subject 
matter before it considers the merits of a case.”14  Ruhrgas AG 
v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 1569 
(1999).  The District Court first addressed the issue of 
intergovernmental immunity, and concluded that the imposition 
of the States‟ escheat acts impermissibly would regulate the 
Federal Government by imposing potential civil and criminal 
penalties on the Government for failure to comply with the acts‟ 
                                                 
14
 In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 
83, 118 S.Ct. 1003 (1998), the Supreme Court disapproved of 
the practice that some courts of appeals, including this Court, 
had adopted of assuming “hypothetical jurisdiction” when 
facing difficult jurisdictional questions in situations in which the 
party entitled to prevail on the merits would be the same party 
prevailing if the court did not have jurisdiction.  Id. at 93-94, 
118 S.Ct. at 1012.  Under the rule of Steel Co., when a court 
lacks jurisdiction its “only function . . . is that of announcing the 
fact and dismissing the cause” as any further discussion would 
amount to an “advisory opinion.”  Id. at 94, 101, 118 S.Ct. at 
1012, 1016. 
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record-keeping and reporting requirements, and would interfere 
with Congress‟s constitutional power, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, 
cl. 2, to “dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations 
respecting the . . . Property belonging to the United States.”  
App. at 28-30.  The Court also observed that implementing the 
laws “could result in multiple obligations on the same bond by 
the United States,” id. at 30, because the respective States would 
be substituted as obligors on the bonds, while the Federal 
Government would remain contractually and statutorily 
obligated on the bonds to the original bondholder or his legal 
successors.   
 Next, addressing preemption, the District Court held that 
the States‟ proposal for taking custody of the bonds pursuant to 
their escheat laws impermissibly would interfere with the 
contract between the bondholders and the United States, thus 
conflicting “with the narrow regulations governing redemption 
of the bonds.”  Id. at 30-31.  The Court also  rejected the States‟ 
Tenth Amendment reserved power claim that they had the right 
to enforce their unclaimed property acts to gain custody of the 
proceeds of the savings bonds.  In this regard, the Court held 
because the States‟ acts had been preempted, Congress had not 
infringed the States‟ reserved powers by exercising powers not 
delegated to the United States.  Finally, the Court held that the 
States‟ notice and comment claim failed because the Escheat 
Decision concerns government contracts and thus the Decision 
explicitly was exempt from the requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 
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553.
15
  See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (stating that “[t]his section applies 
. . . except to the extent there is involved . . . a matter relating to 
agency . . . contracts”).  Alternatively, with respect to the States‟ 
notice and comment claim the Court held that the Escheat 
Decision was an “interpretive rule” or “general statement[] of 
policy” not subject to the statute‟s requirements.  See 5 U.S.C. § 
553(b)(A) (stating with exceptions not relevant here that the 
APA‟s notice provision does not apply to “interpretive rules, 
general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, 
procedure, or practice”).    
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 On this appeal, the States essentially do not challenge the 
District Court‟s ruling rejecting their 5 U.S.C. § 553 notice and 
comment argument, and therefore they have waived their right 
to contend that the Court erred in making that ruling.  See FDIC 
v. Deglau, 207 F.3d 153, 169 (3d Cir. 2000).  They indicate, 
however, in their brief that they contingently “do assert a claim 
under the APA concerning Treasury‟s failure to promulgate its 
Escheat Decision through notice and comment rulemaking or to 
publish it in the Federal Register . . . but [do so] simply to 
forestall any assertion by defendants that the Escheat Decision is 
agency action that preempts the States‟ cause of action under 
their escheat statutes.”  Appellants‟ br. at 17 n.5.  The 
Government, however, does not make that contention as it 
argues that federal constitutional provisions, laws, and duly 
adopted regulations preempt the States‟ unclaimed property acts. 
 Obviously, the Escheat Decision has no preemptive effect as it 
merely is the Treasury‟s opinion as to the effect of those primary 
sources of law. 
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 When it addressed the sovereign immunity and 
jurisdictional issues, the District Court concluded that the 
Escheat Decision and the Government‟s refusal to turn over the 
unclaimed bonds did not constitute “final agency action” subject 
to judicial review.  See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (“Agency action made 
reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is 
no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial 
review.  A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency 
action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on 
the review of the final agency action.”).16  On February 5, 2010, 
the Court entered an order dismissing this action.  This appeal 
followed. 
 
III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The question of whether the District Court had 
jurisdiction is at issue in this appeal.  Accordingly, we will 
address its jurisdiction in our discussion below.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 Our review of the dismissal in this case involving a facial 
challenge to the District Court‟s jurisdiction is plenary.  In re 
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 The District Court did not specify whether it based its 
decision to dismiss the case on the merits pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) or on its lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).  As 
we discuss below, regardless of the District Court‟s intent we 
affirm its dismissal on the basis of Rule 12(b)(6) as we are 
satisfied that it had jurisdiction. 
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Kaiser Grp. Int‟l Inc., 399 F.3d 558, 561 (3d Cir. 2005).  Thus, 
in our jurisdictional determination we “accept all [the] well-
pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the 
light most favorable to the [States].”  Id.   
 We exercise plenary review of the District Court‟s order 
granting the Government‟s motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.  See Allen ex rel. Martin v. 
LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 2011).  
Similarly, as in our jurisdictional review, in reviewing the 
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “we accept all factual allegations 
as true [and] construe the complaint in the light most favorable 
to the [States].”  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 
77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 
292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)).  A court may grant a 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “only if, accepting all 
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing 
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, [it] finds that [a] 
plaintiff‟s claims lack facial plausibility.”  Id. (citing Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-
65 (2007)). 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 Without a waiver of sovereign immunity, a court is 
without subject matter jurisdiction over claims against federal 
agencies or officials in their official capacities.  United States v. 
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Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 1351 (1980) (“The 
United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it 
consents to be sued.”) (alteration and citation omitted).  A 
waiver of sovereign immunity must be express and 
unambiguous to confer subject matter jurisdiction on a court.  
United States v. Bein, 214 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2000).  As the 
Supreme Court said in United States v. United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514, 60 S.Ct. 653, 657 (1940), 
“[c]onsent alone gives jurisdiction to adjudge against a 
sovereign.  Absent that consent, the attempted exercise of 
judicial power is void.”  Moreover, as the Court also has 
explained “a waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly 
construed in favor of the sovereign,” Orff v. United States, 545 
U.S. 596, 601-02, 125 S.Ct. 2606, 2610 (2005), and “[t]he terms 
of [the] waiver define the extent of the court‟s jurisdiction.”  
United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 841, 106 S.Ct. 2224, 
2229 (1986) (citation omitted). 
 The States initially argue that the proposed application of 
their respective unclaimed property acts to the savings bonds or 
their proceeds does not implicate sovereign immunity because it 
does not create a context in which the Federal Defendants might 
be able to assert their sovereign immunity.  The States predicate 
this argument on the circumstance that the United States does 
not assert an ownership interest in the proceeds of the unclaimed 
bonds or in the bonds themselves.  We, however, conclude that 
this argument lacks merit.  In rejecting the States‟ argument we 
note that we have observed, rather unsurprisingly, that 
“sovereign immunity is implicated” when “a plaintiff [is] suing 
the United States.”  Scheafnocker v. Comm‟r, 642 F.3d 428, 433 
n.8 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Becton Dickinson and Co. v. 
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Wolckenhauer, 215 F.3d 340, 345 (3d Cir. 2000)); see S. Delta 
Water Agency v. U.S. Dep‟t of Interior, 767 F.2d 531, 536 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (noting that “[f]ederal agencies and instrumentalities, 
as well as federal employees acting in their official capacities 
within their authority are [also] immune from suit” absent a 
congressional waiver of sovereign immunity) (citation omitted). 
 The States next assert that even if sovereign immunity is 
implicated in this case, the APA provides for its waiver.  We 
agree with the States‟ APA argument and thus hold that the 
District Court erred to the extent it relied on sovereign immunity 
to dismiss the case under Rule 12(b)(1).  In considering 
sovereign immunity we initially observe that the APA “sets forth 
the procedures by which federal agencies are accountable to the 
public and their actions subject to review by the courts.”  
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 
2773 (1992).  Thus, the APA in 5 U.S.C. § 702 provides in 
relevant part:   
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency 
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by 
agency action within the meaning of a relevant 
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.  An 
action in a court of the United States seeking 
relief other than money damages and stating a 
claim that an agency or an officer or employee 
thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity 
or under color of legal authority shall not be 
dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the 
ground that it is against the United States or that 
the United States is an indispensable party. 
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The second sentence of the above portion of section 702 had its 
origin in the 1976 amendments to the APA by which Congress 
sought to “remove three technical barriers to the consideration 
on the merits of citizens‟ complaints against the Federal 
Government, its agencies, or employees.”  H.R. Rep. No. 94-
1656, at 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6121, 6123.  
A key “technical barrier” that Congress removed was “the 
defense of sovereign immunity as a bar to judicial review of 
Federal administrative action otherwise subject to judicial 
review.”  5 U.S.C. § 702, Historical and Statutory Notes.  The 
Supreme Court subsequently clarified that “it is undisputed that 
the 1976 amendment to § 702 was intended to broaden the 
avenues for judicial review of agency action by eliminating the 
defense of sovereign immunity in cases covered by the 
amendment.”  Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 891-92, 
108 S.Ct. 2722, 2731 (1988).  Thus, section 702 “provides both 
a waiver of sovereign immunity and a right of judicial review.”  
NVE, Inc. v. Dep‟t of Health and Human Servs., 436 F.3d 182, 
189 (3d Cir. 2006).   
 The States now contend that the District Court erred in 
holding that the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity 
under section 702 is limited to “final agency action.”17  The 
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 The States took the position before the District Court that if a 
waiver of sovereign immunity was necessary, the Escheat 
Decision would have to have been “final agency action” for it to 
be reviewable under the APA.  That contention is inconsistent 
with their position on this appeal.  The States complain that the 
District Court “severely limited discovery to the issues of 
ripeness and whether Treasury‟s policy on escheat constituted 
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APA in 5 U.S.C. § 704 sets forth limitations on the type of 
agency actions reviewable under the APA, as it provides that 
“[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency 
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are 
subject to judicial review.  A preliminary, procedural, or 
intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is 
subject to review on the review of the final agency action.”  See 
5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (“„agency action‟ includes the whole or a 
part of an  agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the 
equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act”).  The District 
Court concluded that because the Escheat Decision was not 
reviewable by statute and was not a “final agency action,” 
section 702 did not waive sovereign immunity in this case.     
 But the District Court‟s conclusion was at odds with 
opinions of several courts of appeals that have clarified that the 
waiver of sovereign immunity in section 702 extends to all non-
monetary claims against federal agencies and their officers, 
regardless of whether or not the cases seek review of “agency 
action” or “final agency action” as set forth in section 704.  For 
example, in Trudeau v. Federal Trade Commission, 456 F.3d 
178, 187 (D.C. Cir. 2006), the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit held that section 702‟s 
                                                                                                             
final agency action,” Appellants‟ reply br. at 2, and assert that 
broader discovery would have been useful on the issues of 
“whether escheat of unclaimed bonds would interfere with the 
administration of the federal bond program, or subject Treasury 
to double liability, or confuse bondholders.”  Id. at 2-3.  They, 
however, do not ask us to reverse because of the Court‟s 
limitation on discovery. 
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waiver of sovereign immunity “is not limited to APA cases” and 
applies “regardless of whether the elements of an APA cause of 
action are satisfied.”  In Trudeau, the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) issued what the plaintiff alleged was a false and 
misleading press release about his business activities.  The 
plaintiff asserted that the FTC violated his rights under the First 
Amendment and he was entitled to relief under 5 U.S.C. § 706, 
which provides that a reviewing court may set aside agency 
action found to be “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, 
or limitations.”  Id. at 188.  The district court dismissed the 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the 
press release was not “final agency action” under section 704.  
Id. at 182.  The court of appeals in reversing held that even 
though the plaintiff‟s claims failed on the merits that 
circumstance made no difference for jurisdictional purposes 
because regardless of whether the FTC press release constituted 
a “final agency action” the District Court had jurisdiction.  In 
reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals cited the Senate 
Report accompanying the 1976 APA amendments, which 
indicated that section 702‟s partial waiver of sovereign 
immunity extended to nonstatutory review
18
 of federal 
administrative action, and thus included the plaintiff‟s claims 
even if he had not made them under the APA.  Id. at 187 (citing 
S. Rep. No. 94-996, at 8 (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6121, 6129).   
 In its opinion the Trudeau court dealt with the first 
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 Such lawsuits “are called „nonstatutory‟ because they are not 
brought under the statutes that specially provide for review of 
agency action.”  Jaffee, 592 F.2d at 719 n.12. 
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sentence of section 702 which reads, “[a] person suffering legal 
wrong because of agency action . . . is entitled to judicial review 
thereof,” but then emphasized that the statute‟s waiver of 
sovereign immunity was in the second sentence of section 702 
which reads:   
An action in a court of the United States seeking 
relief other than money damages and stating a 
claim that an agency or an officer or employee 
thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity 
or under color of legal authority shall not be 
dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the 
ground that it is against the United States or that 
the United States is an indispensable party.   
Id. at 185.  The court of appeals emphasized that while 
the second sentence refers to a claim against an 
“agency,” and thus carries that limitation to the scope of 
the waiver of sovereign immunity, the sentence does not 
use the terms “agency action” or “final agency action.”  
Furthermore, the court of appeals observed that the 
House and Senate Reports accompanying the 1976 
amendments reflected Congress‟s intent to waive 
immunity for “any” and ”all” actions for non-monetary 
relief against an agency.  Id. at 187 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 
94-1656, at 3, S. Rep. No. 94-996, at 8, reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6129).  In sum, the court of appeals held 
that section 704‟s “final agency action” requirement only 
limited the viability of claims made under the APA, and 
because section 702 operated as a waiver for all non-
monetary claims, including those claims not made under 
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the APA, section 704 did not limit section 702‟s waiver 
of sovereign immunity.    
 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently 
agreed with Trudeau that section 702‟s waiver of sovereign 
immunity is not limited to actions brought under the APA.  In 
Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 
2011), a veterans‟ group claimed that the Department of 
Veterans Affairs‟ dilatory processing of mental health claims 
violated the veterans‟ constitutional right to benefits.  Id. at 860-
61.  In Veterans for Common Sense the district court held that 
the “final agency action” limitation in section 704 restricted the 
waiver of sovereign immunity in section 702, and inasmuch as 
the delays in processing claims did not constitute “final agency 
action,” section 702 did not waive sovereign immunity.  Id. at 
863.  The court of appeals reversed, concurring with Trudeau 
and holding that the first sentence of section 702 referred to a 
cause of action created by the APA, and not any jurisdictional 
limitation.  Id. at 866 (“The first and second sentences of § 702 
play quite different roles.”).  Therefore, the court of appeals held 
that section 702 waived sovereign immunity for purposes of the 
plaintiff‟s request for injunctive relief based on the Constitution, 
even if judicial review did not involve “agency action” under 
section 704.   
 The Veterans for Common Sense court relied on its 
earlier decision in  Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United 
States, 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989), where the plaintiffs alleged 
that there had been First and Fourth Amendment violations 
when federal agencies secretly recorded church services.  There, 
the court of appeals noted that while the original 1946 form of 
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section 702, which contained the first but not second sentence, 
may have limited judicial review to “agency action,” the 1976 
amendments, which added the second sentence, reflected an 
“unqualified waiver of sovereign immunity in actions seeking 
nonmonetary relief against legal wrongs for which governmental 
agencies are accountable,” and “[n]othing in the language of the 
amendment suggests that the waiver of sovereign immunity is 
limited to claims challenging conduct falling in the narrow 
definition of „agency action.‟”  Id. at 525.    
 Other courts of appeals have taken the same position as 
the Trudeau and Veterans for Common Sense courts.  In Delano 
Farms Co. v. California Table Grape Commission, 655 F.3d 
1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011), the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit held that grape growers could maintain a patent 
claim against the United States Department of Agriculture for 
declaratory relief because section 702 applied broadly to waive 
sovereign immunity for all claims not seeking money damages.  
The Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and First Circuits have 
viewed the waiver of sovereign immunity in the second sentence 
of section 702 similarly.  See Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng‟rs, 667 F.3d 765, 775 (7th Cir. 2011) (“the conditions of § 
704 affect the right of action contained in the first sentence of § 
702, but they do not limit the waiver of immunity in § 702‟s 
second sentence”) (citing Veterans for Common Sense, 644 F.3d 
at 866-68); Blagojevich v. Gates, 519 F.3d 370, 372 (7th Cir. 
2008) (holding that section 702 waives immunity for a lawsuit 
by a state governor alleging that the Department of Defense 
violated a statute requiring the governor‟s approval before 
moving a national guard unit from the state); Puerto Rico v. 
United States, 490 F.3d 50, 57-58 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that 
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section 702 encompasses all actions for specific relief against a 
federal agency or its officers).   
 Although we acknowledge that section 702 is not a model 
of clarity, our independent review of our precedents and the 
statute‟s legislative history leads us to agree with the position 
taken by the courts of appeals in the opinions to which we have 
referred.  In Specter v. Garrett, 995 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1993), 
rev‟d on other grounds sub nom. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 
462, 114 S.Ct. 1719 (1994), we held that an action seeking an 
order enjoining the Secretary of the Navy from closing a naval 
shipyard could proceed under the Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Act of 1990 despite the defendants‟ invocation of 
sovereign immunity, stating that “the waiver of sovereign 
immunity contained in § 702 is not limited to suits brought 
under the APA.”  Id. at 410.  Although we did not address 
directly whether section 704 operates as a limitation on section 
702‟s waiver of sovereign immunity, we recently clarified that 
the judicial review provisions of the APA such as section 704, 
are not jurisdictional, but rather “provide a limited cause of 
action for parties adversely affected by agency action.”  
Chehazeh v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 666 F.3d 118, 
125 n.11 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Oryszak v. Sullivan, 576 F.3d 
522, 525 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).  “Thus, if agency action is . . . not 
final agency action, 5 U.S.C. § 704, a plaintiff who challenges 
such an action cannot state a claim under the APA . . . and the 
action must be dismissed.”  Id. (citing Oryszak, 576 F.3d at 525) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).    
 The House of Representatives Report accompanying the 
1976 amendments confirms that Congress contemplated that the 
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amendments would implement a broad waiver of sovereign 
immunity.  As stated above, prior to the amendments section 
702 contained the first sentence, which provided that a person 
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant 
statute is entitled to judicial review, but it did not contain the 
second sentence.  Thus, in 1976 when Congress added the 
second sentence it did so for the specific purpose of waiving 
sovereign immunity.  See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1656, at 1, reprinted 
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6121.  The House Report, however, 
explained that the second sentence of section 702, providing that 
a federal agency and its officers could be named as defendants 
in non-monetary actions, was subject to limitations.  First, the 
amendment only waives sovereign immunity for actions in a 
federal court; second, such actions must seek non-monetary 
relief; and third, it is “applicable only to functions falling within 
the definition of „agency‟ in 5 U.S.C. section 701.”  Id. at 11, 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6131.   
 But the House Report does not state that there is a fourth 
limitation limiting the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 
702 to suits challenging “agency action” as defined in the APA. 
 Rather, the Report indicates that “[t]he amendment made to 
section 702 of title 5 would eliminate the defense of sovereign 
immunity in any action in a federal court seeking relief other 
than money damages and stating a claim based on the assertion 
of unlawful official action by an agency or by an officer or 
employee of that agency.”  Id. at 3, reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6123 (emphasis added);  see id. at 9, 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6129 (“[T]he time now [has] come to eliminate 
the sovereign immunity defense in all equitable actions for 
specific relief against a Federal agency or officer acting in an 
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official capacity.”) (emphasis added.).  Accordingly, section 704 
in limiting review to “final agency action” concerns whether a 
plaintiff has a cause of action under the APA that can survive a 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) but does not provide a 
basis for dismissal on grounds of sovereign immunity.
19
  Here, 
of course, the States seek equitable relief and not monetary 
damages and accordingly, the Government‟s sovereign 
immunity from this action has been waived.
20
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 The Government contends that the waiver of sovereign 
immunity should be limited to actions brought under federal law 
rather than state law as the States have done here to the extent 
that they seek relief under their unclaimed property acts.  
Though in view of the circumstance that most cases against the 
Government are under federal law so that Congress probably 
was focused on that law when it adopted the 1976 amendments 
to the APA, we see no support for the distinction that the 
Government makes between federal and state law in either the 
text or the history of section 702. 
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 We emphasize here that although in this action the States seek 
to recover a very large sum of money, this action does not seek 
“money damages” within the meaning of section 702.  In 
Bowen, 487 U.S. 879, 108 S.Ct. 2722, the State of 
Massachusetts sued the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
in order to enforce a provision of the Medicaid statute requiring 
that the Federal Government reimburse it for certain Medicaid 
expenditures that it had made.  The Court held that section 702 
waived sovereign immunity in that case even though 
Massachusetts sought to make a monetary recovery from the 
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 Although the defense of sovereign immunity raises a 
claim constituting a jurisdictional limitation, even if, as we now 
hold here, the defense is unsuccessful, the court in which the 
plaintiff has brought the action cannot entertain the case unless 
it has jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution and the 
statutes that Congress has adopted providing a federal court with 
jurisdiction over the case.  Accordingly, as distinct from its 
arguments that the States‟ lawsuit does not fall within the APA‟s 
waiver of sovereign immunity, the Government now contends 
                                                                                                             
Federal Government, observing that “[o]ur cases have long 
recognized the distinction between an action at law for damages 
— which are intended to provide a victim with monetary 
compensation for an injury to his person, property, or reputation 
— and an equitable action for specific relief — which may 
include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee 
with backpay, or for „the recovery of specific property or 
monies, ejectment from land, or injunction either directing or 
restraining the defendant officer‟s actions.‟  Larson v. Domestic 
& Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 688, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 
1460 (1949) (emphasis added)).”  Id. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2732; 
see id. at 895, 108 S.Ct. at 2732 (explaining that “[d]amages are 
given to the plaintiff to substitute for a suffered loss, whereas 
specific remedies are not substitute remedies at all, but attempt 
to give the plaintiff the very thing to which he was entitled.” 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  Accordingly, 
the Court held that “[t]he fact that a judicial remedy may require 
one party to pay money to another is not a sufficient reason to 
characterize the relief as „money damages.‟” Id. at 893, 108 
S.Ct. at 2732. 
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— even though it did not advance this point in the District Court 
— that the District Court lacked an independent basis for federal 
question jurisdiction because the States are making claims under 
state, not federal law.  Thus, the Government contends that the 
District Court did not have jurisdiction over the States‟ action 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or, indeed, under any other statute.
21
  
Although we sometimes have referred to the APA as conferring 
“jurisdiction,” see, e.g., Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 200 
(3d Cir. 2005), the Supreme Court has stated that “the APA does 
not afford an implied grant of subject-matter jurisdiction 
permitting federal judicial review of agency action.”  Califano v. 
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107, 97 S.Ct. 980, 985 (1977).  
Accordingly, we have recognized that ordinarily “the „federal 
question‟ statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, „confer[s] jurisdiction on 
federal courts to review agency action.‟”  Chehazeh, 666 F.3d at 
125 n.11 (quoting Califano, 430 U.S. at 105, 97 S.Ct. at 984).  
See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 317 n.47, 99 S.Ct. 
1705, 1725 n.47 (1979) (“Jurisdiction to review agency action is 
found in 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”); Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 
712, 718 (3d Cir. 1979) (“[S]ection 702, when it applies, waives 
sovereign immunity in „nonstatutory‟ review of agency action 
under section 1331.”) (emphasis added).   
 We thus must decide whether the States‟ claims arise 
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 Of course, inasmuch as we must assure ourselves that the 
District Court had subject matter jurisdiction the Government 
may assert this jurisdictional argument initially on this appeal.  
See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 73, 
117 S.Ct. 1055, 1071-72 (1997). 
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“under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” 
so that the District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331, or whether the Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 
another statute.  See Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 185 (“[B]ecause the 
APA neither confers nor restricts jurisdiction, we must still 
determine whether some other statute provides it.”).  See 
Alvarado v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 509 F.3d 1008, 1016 
(9th Cir. 2007) (“To confer subject matter jurisdiction in an 
action against a sovereign, in addition to a waiver of sovereign 
immunity, there must be statutory authority vesting a district 
court with subject matter jurisdiction.”).  In considering the 
federal jurisdiction question we recognize that it might be 
thought that inasmuch as the States are attempting to enforce 
their unclaimed property acts in this action, this case could not 
be within federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.   
 Even though the States have brought this action with the 
intent ultimately to obtain relief under their laws there is no 
escape from the fact that this case largely involves the 
Government‟s claim that federal statutes and regulations 
preempt the States‟ unclaimed property acts.  That circumstance 
compels us to consider the long established well-pleaded 
complaint rule to the end that “federal courts have federal 
question jurisdiction only when a federal claim appears in the 
complaint, and not when a federal preemption defense may 
eventually be raised in litigation.”  Levine v. United Healthcare 
Corp., 402 F.3d 156, 162 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).  Yet 
the States not unreasonably cite Grable & Sons Metal Products, 
Inc. v. Darue Engineering and Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308, 
125 S.Ct. 2363 (2005), as support for their contention that the 
District Court did have jurisdiction.  It is true that aspects of 
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Grable read in isolation seem to support the States‟ jurisdictional 
contention with respect to the preemption issues in this case for 
this case raises and, indeed, is about, in the words of Grable, 
“significant federal issues.”  Grable, 545 U.S. at 312, 125 S.Ct. 
at 2367.  Moreover, the state law claims being advanced here 
under the States‟ unclaimed property acts, in the words of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence even before Grable, “depend[ ] 
upon the construction or application of [federal law].”  Smith v. 
Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199, 41 S.Ct. 243, 
245 (1921).
22
  Furthermore, this case is a direct action against 
the Government and thus differs from the ordinary preemption 
case in which a private defendant relies on federal law as a 
defense to a state cause of action.  See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. 
Mensing, 131 S.Ct. 2557, 2577-78 (2011).  Indeed, we cannot 
help but wonder whether the States could have cast this case as a 
declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that a 
judgment obtained in a proceeding under their unclaimed 
property acts would be enforceable against the Federal 
Government with respect to the proceeds of matured but 
unredeemed savings bonds.
23
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 The dominance of federal law in this case is highlighted in the 
States‟ brief in which they correctly point out that the “United 
States does not dispute that the States‟ unclaimed property laws 
require unclaimed savings bonds to be turned over to state 
custody pending location of the absent owners.  The question on 
the merits is thus whether federal law somehow preempts the 
operation of these escheat laws.”  Appellants‟ br. at 22. 
 
23
 In this regard, we note that the Supreme Court indicated in 
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  Grable, however, insofar as the States advance it as 
support for their jurisdictional contentions, has its limitations.  
In Grable a federal taxpayer brought an action to quiet title in a 
state court against a purchaser of the property who acquired the 
property by a quitclaim deed from the Government.  The 
Government sold the property to the purchaser to satisfy the 
taxpayer‟s tax delinquency.  In the quiet title action the taxpayer 
asserted that the purchaser‟s title was invalid because the 
Government did not follow proper procedure in giving required 
notice when seizing the property.  The purchaser removed the 
case to a federal court claiming that there was federal question 
jurisdiction even though the plaintiff-taxpayer sought to quiet 
title to its property in a state court, a classic state law procedure, 
and even though there was no suggestion in the case that there 
was diversity of citizenship between the parties.  The taxpayer 
moved to remand the case to state court but the district court 
denied the motion and the court of appeals affirmed.  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed. 
 The Supreme Court held that there was federal question 
jurisdiction in Grable principally because of the dominance of 
                                                                                                             
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731, that the 1976 
amendment referring to relief other than money damages  “does 
not foreclose judicial review of the actions brought by the State 
challenging the Secretary‟s disallowance decisions.”  The Court 
first noted that “insofar as the complaints sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief, they were certainly not actions for money 
damages.”  The Court went on to state that “even the monetary 
aspects of the relief that the State sought are not „money 
damages‟ as that term is used in the law.” 
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significant federal issues in that case.  But as the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said in California Schock Trauma 
Air Rescue v. State Compensation Insurance Fund, 636 F.3d 
538, 542 (9th Cir. 2011), “the Grable complaint did present a 
federal issue on its face” with respect to the Internal Revenue 
Service not following proper procedures in the seizure of the 
taxpayer‟s property.  Therefore, the court of appeals understood 
Grable to uphold the assertion of federal jurisdiction because the 
complaint “satisfie[d] both the well-pleaded complaint rule and 
passe[d] the implicates significant federal issues test.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).  We also are 
aware that the Supreme Court itself in Empire Healthcare 
Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699, 126 S.Ct. 2121, 
2136 (2006), emphasized the limitations of Grable when it 
indicated that Grable dealt with a “special and small category” 
of cases that qualify for federal question jurisdiction. 
 In the end, however, we do not find it necessary to decide 
whether the District Court had jurisdiction by reason of the 
presence of the preemption issue in this case.  We bypass the 
preemption jurisdictional question because it is clear that the 
Court had jurisdiction in light of the States having advanced a 
significant Tenth Amendment claim in their complaint which 
seeks relief on the basis of the “Treasury‟s Escheat Decision 
[having] violate[d] the Tenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.”  App. at 109.  In considering the effect of this 
claim with respect to federal jurisdiction we start from the 
unquestioned principle that jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 when a cause of action arises under federal law on the 
basis of the plaintiff having made a claim under the Tenth 
Amendment.  As the court of appeals indicated in Bolden v. City 
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of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238, 247 (5th Cir. 1978), rev‟d on other 
grounds, City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490 
(1980): 
The abuse of local governmental power, when of 
the constitutional magnitude in this case, is a 
power denied the States by the Constitution 
within the meaning of the tenth amendment.  The 
power to remedy the unconstitutional wrong is 
one delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution. The Constitution expressly provides 
for federal court jurisdiction in claims arising 
under this Constitution (or) Laws of the United 
States.  U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2.  Congress has 
given the federal courts original jurisdiction over 
such claims.  28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hodges v. 
Shalala, 121 F. Supp. 2d 854, 863-64 (D.S.C. 2000) (federal 
question jurisdiction exists under section 1331 in action in 
which state contends that Congress overstepped boundaries of 
the Tenth Amendment and the Spending Clause when it 
statutorily attached certain conditions to states‟ receipt of federal 
funding).    
The Supreme Court at one time regarded the Tenth 
Amendment as little more than a tautology that could not 
support a cause of action:   
The amendment states but a truism that all is 
retained which has not been surrendered. There is 
  45 
nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest 
that it was more than declaratory of the 
relationship between the national and state 
governments as it had been established by the 
Constitution before the amendment or that its 
purpose was other than to allay fears that the new 
national government might seek to exercise 
powers not granted, and that the states might not 
be able to exercise fully their reserved powers.  
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124, 61 S.Ct. 451, 462 
(1941). 
 More recently, however, the Court has embraced the view 
that the states may invoke the Tenth Amendment as a basis for 
invalidating federal action.  Most notably, in New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 112 S.Ct. 2408 (1992), the Court 
invalidated under the Tenth Amendment portions of a federal 
law concerning disposal of radioactive waste.  The origin of that 
case may be traced to Congress having reacted to a shortage of 
suitable radioactive waste disposal sites by passing the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985.  The 
1985 statute imposed responsibility on the states to dispose of 
waste within their borders, including a requirement that states 
“take title” to waste not disposed of as of 1996 and that these 
states would be liable for damages incurred by their failure to 
take possession of that waste.  Id. at 153-54, 112 S.Ct. at 2416.  
The Court held that the “take title” provisions of the law were 
unconstitutional because by forcing states to take ownership of 
the waste the law impermissibly would “commandeer” state 
governments contrary to the Tenth Amendment.  The Court 
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believed that this attempted exercise of federal power exceeded 
Congress‟s powers under Article I of the Constitution.  In 
reaching its result the Court stated that “[t]he Federal 
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a 
federal regulatory program,” id. at 188, 112 S.Ct. at 2435, 
because doing so would limit state government accountability, 
as state governments forced to implement a federal program 
would be held responsible for decisions they did not make.   
 The Supreme Court in New York v. United States 
rejected the reasoning of Darby and, rather than regarding the 
Tenth Amendment as a mere tautology as it had done in Darby, 
“direct[ed] [courts] to determine . . . whether an incident of state 
sovereignty is protected by a limitation on [congressional] 
power.”  Id. at 157, 112 S.Ct. at 2418.  As in New York v. 
United States, the States in this case claim that Congress is 
asserting a power that it does not have — a de facto federal 
escheat power — that is an affront to a state sovereign 
prerogative: to take custody to property it deems “unclaimed” or 
“abandoned” within its borders. 
 Of course, a court makes a different analysis when 
determining if it has jurisdiction over a claim than it makes 
when considering the merits of the claim.  As the Supreme 
Court has stated, “[d]ismissal for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction because of the inadequacy of the federal claim is 
proper only when the claim is so insubstantial, implausible, 
foreclosed by prior decisions of [the Supreme] Court, or 
otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal 
controversy.”  Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env‟t, 523 U.S. 
83, 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1010 (1998) (internal quotation marks 
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and citation omitted).  While, as we discuss below, we do not 
find that the States‟ Tenth Amendment claim is meritorious, in 
light of developing Tenth Amendment law the claim surely is 
colorable and not frivolous.  Accordingly, the District Court had 
jurisdiction because “[it] is firmly established . . . that the 
absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does 
not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts‟ 
statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”  Id. 
 Inasmuch as the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 over the States‟ Tenth Amendment claim, by 
reason of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 it had jurisdiction over the States‟ 
entire complaint.  Section 1367 provides, with inapplicable 
exceptions, if “the district courts have original jurisdiction, 
[they] shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims 
that are so related to claims in the action within such original 
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy 
under Article III of the United States Constitution.”  Here it is 
clear that all of the States‟ claims are related to their claim under 
the Tenth Amendment.  In this regard, we point out that in the 
introduction to their complaint the States assert that “Treasury‟s 
refusal to comply with state laws governing unclaimed property 
usurps sovereign power exercised by the states since the 
Declaration of Independence, and reserved to the states under 
the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.”  App. at 88.   
 The Supreme Court in City of Chicago v. International 
College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164-65, 118 S.Ct. 523, 529 
(1997), indicated that a district court may exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction if the case before it involves claims “derive[d] from 
a common nucleus of operative fact such that the relationship 
  48 
between the federal claim and the state claim permits the 
conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but 
one constitutional claim.”  (internal quotation marks and 
brackets omitted).  This case fits within that criterion because 
the States in this action have a single goal, i.e., to obtain a 
judgment requiring that the Government remit to them and 
account for the proceeds of matured but unredeemed savings 
bonds.
24
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 The States also assert that the Mandamus and Venue Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1361, and 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (containing the Little 
Tucker Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act), provide for 
federal jurisdiction here but we do not decide whether either 
statute would confer jurisdiction in light of our conclusion that 
the District Court had jurisdiction by reason of the States‟ Tenth 
Amendment claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 
1367. 
 
     Though we do not predicate our result on this point we note 
that if the District Court could not exercise jurisdiction in this 
case it well may be that there would not be any court in which 
plaintiff States could have brought their claims against the 
Federal Defendants under their unclaimed property acts.  After 
all, the New Jersey state courts are well aware that section 702 
“does not waive sovereign immunity in actions in a state court” 
and thus they would not entertain an action seeking an order 
enjoining the Securities and Exchange Commission from 
prosecuting an administrative complaint against the plaintiff in 
the state court action.  First Jersey Secs., Inc. v. Sec. Exch. 
Comm‟n, 476 A.2d 861, 867-68 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
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 B. State-Law Claims and the Supremacy Clause 
 Inasmuch as we have determined that sovereign 
immunity does not bar this action and that the District Court had 
constitutional and statutory jurisdiction we finally reach the 
substantive aspects of the case.  We start this discussion by 
recognizing that although this case is essentially a dispute over 
the application of federal law, the States‟ claims arise from their 
attempt to enforce their unclaimed property acts against the 
Federal Government.  The Government asserts that these claims 
run afoul of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution in art. VI, 
cl. 2, which provides that the Constitution and laws in pursuance 
of it “shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”  State laws may 
violate the Supremacy Clause in two ways.  Under the doctrine 
of federal preemption, state laws are invalid if they “conflict 
with an affirmative command of Congress.”  North Dakota v 
United States, 495 U.S. 423, 434, 110 S.Ct. 1986, 1994 (1990) 
(citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 
(1824)).  And under the doctrine of intergovernmental 
immunity, states may not “regulate the Government directly or 
                                                                                                             
1984).  In view of First Jersey Securities we see no reason to 
believe that even without regard for federal court intervention 
through the exercise of removal jurisdiction or Supreme Court 
appellate review, the New Jersey courts would have entertained 
this action if the State of New Jersey had initiated the case in the 
New Jersey Superior Court and named the Federal Defendants 
as defendants.  Of course, a result that the States did not have 
any forum in which to bring their claims surely would have been 
inconsistent with the intent of Congress in adopting the 1976 
APA amendments. 
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discriminate against it.”   North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 434, 110 
S.Ct. at 1994 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316, 425-37, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819)).     
  1. Federal Preemption 
 Federal preemption doctrine “provid[es] Congress with 
the power to preempt state legislation if it so intends.”  Roth v. 
Norfalco LLC, 651 F.3d 367, 374 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).   There are three types of 
preemption:  express preemption and two types of implied 
preemption, field preemption and conflict preemption.  Farina v. 
Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 115 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Hillsborough 
Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713, 105 
S.Ct. 2371, 2375 (1985)).  There is express preemption when a 
federal enactment contains language that is explicit about its 
preemptive effect.  See St. Thomas-St. John Hotel & Tourism 
Ass‟n v. Gov‟t of the V.I., 218 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2000).  
There is field preemption when Congress has regulated an area 
so pervasively that it has not left room for state regulation.  See 
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 111, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1149 
(2000).  There is conflict preemption when compliance with 
both state and federal law is impossible, “or where state law 
erects an „obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress.‟”  Farina, 625 F.3d at 
115 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Moreover, “[w]here 
Congress has delegated the authority to regulate a particular 
field to an administrative agency, the agency‟s regulations 
issued pursuant to that authority have no less preemptive effect 
than federal statutes.”  Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC, 539 
F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008).  Although courts define the 
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categories of preemption separately the categories are not 
“rigidly distinct.  Indeed, field pre-emption may be understood 
as a species of conflict pre-emption: A state law that falls within 
a pre-empted field conflicts with Congress‟ intent  . . . to 
exclude state regulation.”  English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 
72, 79 n.5, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 2275 n.5 (1990).   
  There are two guiding principles of preemption 
jurisprudence.  “„First, the purpose of Congress is the ultimate 
touchstone in every pre-emption case.‟”  Wyeth v. Levine, 555 
U.S. 555, 565, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, 
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 2259 (1996)).  
Second, we are guided by a “presumption against preemption,” 
Roth, 651 F.3d at 375 (citing Deweese v. Nat‟l R.R. Passenger 
Corp., 590 F.3d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 2009)), because we assume 
“that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be 
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress.”  Levine, 555 U.S. at 565, 129 
S.Ct. at 1194-95 (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485, 116 S.Ct. at 
2250) (internal quotation marks omitted).  However, the 
presumption against preemption does not apply where Congress 
has adopted the statute claimed to have preemptive effect to 
apply in a field that “the States have [not] traditionally 
occupied.”  Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs‟ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 
341, 347-48, 121 S.Ct. 1012, 1017 (2001) (quoting Rice v. Santa 
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152 
(1947)).  
 We agree with the District Court that the federal statutes 
and regulations pertaining to United States savings bonds 
preempt the States‟ unclaimed property acts insofar as the States 
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seek to apply their acts to take custody of the proceeds of the 
matured but unredeemed savings bonds.  In reaching this 
conclusion we recognize that there is no federal statute or 
regulation that expressly preempts the application of the States‟ 
unclaimed property acts in the way that the States seek to 
enforce them in this litigation.  But it is equally important to 
recognize that “[f]ederal law of course governs the interpretation 
of the nature of the rights and obligations created by the 
Government bonds themselves.”  Free, 369 U.S. at 669-70, 82 
S.Ct. at 1094 (quoting Bank of Am. Trust & Savs. Ass‟n v. 
Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 34, 77 S.Ct. 119, 122 (1956)).  Thus, in 
Free a surviving husband filed an action against a beneficiary of 
his wife‟s will to determine the parties‟ rights in United States 
savings bonds that the husband and wife purchased together.  
The Supreme Court held that Texas law providing that the 
savings bonds were community property was inconsistent with 
federal regulations that provide that when either co-owner dies, 
“the survivor will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner 
[of the bonds] and thus the federal regulation preempted the 
Texas law.”  Id. at 664-65, 82 S.Ct. at 1091 (quoting 31 C.F.R. § 
315.61).  While in the case before us the conflict between state 
and federal law is less stark, we similarly hold that the relevant 
federal statutes and regulations preempt the States‟ unclaimed 
property acts. 
 The States‟ unclaimed property acts conflict with federal 
law regarding United States savings bonds in multiple ways.  
First, in advancing the goal of making the bonds “attractive to 
savers and investors,” see Free, 369 U.S. at 669, 82 S.Ct. at 
1093, Congress has authorized the Secretary to implement 
regulations specifying that “owners of savings bonds may keep 
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the bonds after maturity.”  31 U.S.C. § 3105(b)(2)(A).25  The 
plaintiff States‟ unclaimed property acts, by contrast, specify 
that matured bonds are abandoned and their proceeds are subject 
to the acts if not redeemed within a time period as short as one 
year after maturity.  See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:30B-41.2.  
Such provisions starkly conflict with savings bonds regulations 
imposing “conditions governing their redemption.”  31 U.S.C. § 
3105(c)(4); see 31 C.F.R. § 315.5(a) (providing that the 
registered owner of the bond is presumed conclusively to be the 
owner); § 315.15 (providing that savings bonds are “payable 
only to the owners named on the bonds, except as specifically 
provided in these regulations and then only in the manner and to 
the extent so provided.”); § 315.20(b) (providing that the 
Department of the Treasury will recognize a claim of ownership 
or interest in a bond only if “established by valid, judicial 
proceedings”); § 315.35(a) (providing that payment may be 
made only to persons entitled to it under the regulations); § 
315.39 (providing that the owner of the bond may present it to 
an authorized paying agent for redemption).   
   The States assert that the “restrictions on „payment‟ in 
these regulations foreclose only redemption of bonds by persons 
who are not owners, not application of historic laws governing 
disposition of property not redeemed by its owner.”  Appellants‟ 
br. at 29.   In other words, the States argue that because they 
                                                 
25
 The Secretary effectively has allowed owners of savings 
bonds to keep them after maturity and to earn interest after 
maturity because the Treasury has extended the bonds‟ original 
maturity dates and interest accrues during the extension period.  
See supra note 3. 
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seek only custody of the bond proceeds, their unclaimed 
property acts will not interfere directly with federal contracts or 
the regulations regarding redemption.  However, those 
regulations conflict with the outcome that the States seek here.  
Most critically, application of the States‟ unclaimed property 
acts would interfere with the terms of the contracts between the 
United States and the owners of the bonds because, according to 
the States‟ complaint, they effectively would substitute the 
respective States for the United States as the obligor on affected 
savings bonds.  See app. at 99 (asserting that “delivery of an 
Unclaimed Bond to a State . . . will discharge the Treasury from 
its obligation under the bond,” such that the bond owners may 
“claim their property from the state”).  As the Government 
points out, the bonds are pledged “on the credit of the United 
States,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 2, and not on the credit of any 
individual state.  Both bondholders and the United States, who 
bargained for a federal redemption process that the Federal 
Government set forth in detail in the relevant statutes and 
regulations, instead would have to comply with procedures set 
forth in the various States‟ unclaimed property acts, thus 
“intrud[ing] upon the rights and the duties of the United States.” 
 See Free, 369 U.S. at 669, 82 S.Ct. at 1094.   The federal 
regulations regarding redemption effectively would be nullified.  
 This change in redemption procedures if the States obtain 
custody of the proceeds of the matured but unredeemed bonds 
might not be a small thing from the point of view of an owner of 
a bond seeking to redeem it.  As we explained above, 
redemption of a matured savings bond is now an uncomplicated 
process involving little more than a trip to a bank, a venue likely 
to be familiar to the owner of the bond, with the bondholder 
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dealing with a bank employee with whom he already may be 
acquainted.  On the other hand, though it is possible that the 
States would designate the same payment agents as the 
Government now designates if the States obtained custody of the 
proceeds of the bonds, an owner seeking those funds would 
have to navigate whatever procedures the States adopted for the 
owner to receive the funds and those procedures could be more 
complex than those presently in place under federal law.  
Moreover, a bondholder‟s effort to recover the funds in a State‟s 
custody might require the bondowner to deal with what almost 
certainly would be an unfamiliar state bureaucracy.  We simply 
do not know. 
 The Government also has expressed concerns that a 
substitution of the plaintiff States as obligors on the bonds could 
result in the United States being subject to multiple obligations 
on a single savings bond.  Thus, the Government fears that 
bondholders still would have a contractual right to payment 
from the United States based on the terms of the bonds even 
though the various state unclaimed property acts would give 
bondholders the right to recover the proceeds of property 
deemed “abandoned” or “unclaimed” from the States.  Although 
the States have indicated that they would indemnify the Federal 
Government if it was required to make payments on matured 
bonds to bondholders after the Government delivered the 
proceeds of the bonds to the States pursuant to their unclaimed 
property acts, the possible availability of indemnification does 
not change the fact that application of the States‟ acts in the 
redemption process significantly would alter that process as 
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contemplated in the relevant federal regulations.
26
 
 The States note that the federal statutes and regulations 
implementing the savings bond program do not include 
provisions for the disposition of abandoned property, and thus 
they argue that federal law leaves room for the operation of their 
unclaimed property acts in this field.  However, the bond 
proceeds are not “abandoned” or “unclaimed” under federal law 
because the owners of the bonds may redeem them at any time 
after they mature, and thus Congress has not been silent with 
respect to the fate of the proceeds of unclaimed bonds.  The 
States‟ efforts to impose the status of “abandoned” or 
“unclaimed” on the Federal Government‟s obligations only 
underscores the conflict between federal and state law, in which 
federal law must prevail.  There simply is no escape from the 
fact that the Federal Government does not regard matured but 
unredeemed bonds as abandoned even in situations in which a 
state would do exactly that.  Of course, in a preemption analysis 
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 We are not predicating our result on a conclusion that 
honoring a custody-based unclaimed property act might subject 
the United States to multiple liabilities on a single bond.  We 
decline to speculate on what would happen if a bondholder 
sought to redeem a bond by presenting it to a Government 
payment agent and requesting that he be paid the proceeds if the 
Government already had delivered the proceeds of the bond to a 
State pursuant to its unclaimed property act.  That situation is 
not before us and, in any event, even disregarding the possibility 
that the Government might face multiple liabilities on a single 
bond by complying with a State‟s unclaimed property act, the 
States‟ unclaimed property acts are preempted. 
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the distinction between the custody of the proceeds of the bonds 
or physical custody of the bonds themselves is without legal 
significance.  The States seek the transfer of $1.6 billion of 
federally-held funds to their treasuries together with a 
substantial realignment of the obligations that the bonds 
evidence and the procedures for redemption that federal laws 
and regulations have established.  It is clear to us that the federal 
statutes and regulations are sufficiently pervasive so as not to 
leave room for the enforcement of the unclaimed property acts 
to achieve the result that the States seek.   
  2. Intergovernmental Immunity 
 The Supreme Court‟s decision in McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) at 322, established the bedrock principle that “the States 
have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, 
burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the 
constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution 
the powers vested in the national government.”  Thus, that 
famous decision is the source of the doctrine of 
intergovernmental immunity.  We agree with the District Court 
that the States‟ desired application of their unclaimed property 
acts would violate the constitutional principles of 
intergovernmental immunity that “states may not directly 
regulate the federal government‟s operations or property.”  See 
Arizona v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 332, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing 
Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 178-80, 96 S.Ct. 2006, 2012-13 
(1976)).   
 First, in this regard, the unclaimed property acts would 
interfere with Congress‟s “[p]ower to dispose of and make all 
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needful Rules Acts and Regulations respecting the . . . Property 
belonging to the United States.”  See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 
2.  On this point, the States argue that the United States no 
longer has a beneficial interest in the undisbursed proceeds from 
the matured but unredeemed bonds.  But we disagree.  In 
support of their position, the States cite United States v. Klein, 
303 U.S. 276, 58 S.Ct. 536 (1938), in which the Escheator of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania sought to recover funds that a 
private company owed its bondholders pursuant to a judgment 
entered by a federal district court.  Unclaimed funds were paid 
into a court registry and later transferred to the United States 
Treasury under 28 U.S.C. § 852, which at that time provided 
that when money deposited into the registry of a federal court 
was unclaimed for five years, it would be deposited with the 
Treasury, and further provided that “[a]ny person or persons . . . 
entitled to any such money may . . . obtain an order of court 
directing payment of such money to the claimant.”  The 
Supreme Court in holding that the State of Pennsylvania could 
acquire title to unclaimed funds through valid escheat 
proceedings observed that the United States held the funds for a 
limited administrative purpose, and did not assert “any right, 
title or interest” in the funds.  303 U.S. at 280, 58 S.Ct. at 538.  
Further, 28 U.S.C. § 852 “contemplate[ed] that changes in 
ownership of the fund may occur, since it provides that after the 
right to the fund has been finally adjudicated and it has been 
covered into the Treasury it shall be paid over to any person 
entitled, upon full proof of his right to receive it.”  Id. at 282, 58 
S.Ct. at 539.   
 The plaintiff States also rely on In re Moneys Deposited, 
243 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1957), where we addressed the status of 
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private funds that were not claimed in bankruptcy proceedings 
and thus were transferred to the United States Treasury for 
administrative purposes under 28 U.S.C. § 2042, the successor 
legislation to the statute in issue in Klein.  Following Klein, this 
Court held that Pennsylvania could obtain title to the funds 
through escheat proceedings because, as in Klein, the United 
States did not have a beneficial interest in the money deposited 
in the federal registry.  In this case, in contrast to how it 
obtained the funds in issue in both Klein and Moneys Deposited, 
the United States did not acquire the funds due on matured but 
unredeemed bonds through the exercise of an administrative 
function.  Quite to the contrary, the Government acquired the 
funds from its sale of savings bonds for its own use.  Thus, 
unlike the claimants in Klein and Moneys Deposited, the States 
here do not seek funds due on privately undertaken obligations, 
as in Klein, or seek funds in which the Government as custodian 
never had a property interest as was true in both Klein and 
Money Deposited.  Rather, the States seek to acquire funds that 
have their origin in debt that the United States incurred to 
finance the operations of the Government.    
 As did the District Court, we find Bowsher to be 
persuasive on this point.  In Bowsher, 23 states sued the 
Comptroller General of the United States and the Secretary 
claiming the right to custody pursuant to their respective 
unclaimed property acts of money held by the Treasury pursuant 
to 31 U.S.C. § 1322, which granted the Treasury custody of 
money that federal agencies owed to persons whose 
whereabouts were unknown.  935 F.2d at 334.  Like the plaintiff 
States in this case, the plaintiffs in Bowsher argued that they 
wanted to return the unclaimed property to its true owners, but 
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the court observed that “[w]hen the United States sets aside 
money for the payment of specific debts, it does not thereby lose 
its property interest in that money.”  Id.  The court further stated:  
The money here is federal money.  That various 
persons have claims against the United States in 
amounts exactly matching the funds, and intended 
by Congress to be paid from these funds, does not 
give those individuals a property interest in the 
money.  Thus, the states‟ plan would amount to 
direct regulation of federal property.  In extracting 
funds from the Treasury, the states would 
effectively subordinate federal property to their 
own laws and appropriate that property, at least 
for a period, for themselves.   
Id.  Accordingly, the court held that the states‟ plan to take 
custody of the money violated the doctrine of intergovernmental 
immunity.   
 We recognize that the States argue that their unclaimed 
property acts come, in the words of Bowsher, “with a patina of 
ancient history,” see id. at 335, and that there is a presumption 
against preemption of laws of such origin.  Nevertheless, we see 
no reason to reach a different result here from that reached in 
Bowsher.  Although the United States must pay holders of 
matured bonds the sums due on the bonds when the owners 
present them for payment, until it does so the funds remain 
federal property, and the Government may use the proceeds 
from the sale of savings bonds “for expenditures authorized by 
[federal] law,” 31 U.S.C. § 3105(a).   
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 The States argue that instead of following Bowsher we 
should be guided by the Supreme Court‟s analysis in 
Connecticut Mutual Life, 333 U.S. at 547, 68 S.Ct. at 686, 
where the Court held that the State of New York could apply its 
unclaimed property act to life insurance policies that out-of-state 
insurers had issued.  In rejecting the insurance company‟s 
argument in Moore that the state law violated the Contract 
Clause, the Court noted that “[t]he state is acting as a 
conservator, not as a party to a contract.”  Id.  Moreover, the 
Court recognized that New York‟s conservatorship of insurance 
money was possible because “[f]oreign corporations must obtain 
state authority to do business, segregate securities, [and] submit 
to examination and state process.”  Id. at 550-51, 68 S.Ct. at 
668.  But states‟ extensive regulatory powers over corporations 
operating within their borders, in light of McCulloch, do not and 
could not have a counterpart in their relationships with the 
Federal Government, and consequently Connecticut Mutual Life 
is inapposite here.   
 For similar reasons, we hold that an order compelling the 
accounting that the plaintiff States request would violate the 
governmental immunity of the United States.  As the District 
Court observed, the States‟ unclaimed property acts impose 
“onerous record-keeping and reporting requirements, [and] civil 
and criminal penalties for failure to comply.”  App. at 29; see, 
e.g., 72 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1301.11 (describing reporting 
requirements); § 1301.25 (failure to comply with reporting 
requirements a criminal offense subject to fine and 
imprisonment); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:30B-93 (subjecting holders 
of unclaimed property to examination of records by the state 
administrator); Mont. Code Ann. § 70-9-824 (providing for 
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financial penalties against holders of unclaimed property who 
fail to report and deliver property to the state administrator).   
Although the States argue that they only seek relief requiring the 
Federal Government to comply with generally applicable laws, 
several of the States have enacted provisions in their unclaimed 
property acts specifically addressed to property within the 
possession of the Federal Government.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
46:30B-41.2 (providing that property where the obligor is a 
branch of the United States government is presumed abandoned 
after one year); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 393.068 (“[a]ll . . . 
personal property . . . held by the federal government . . . shall 
be presumed abandoned if remained unclaimed for five years); 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 447.532 (property held by an agency of the 
United States deemed abandoned if unclaimed for three years); 
72 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1301.9 (property held for its owner by any 
“instrumentality of the United States” unclaimed for five years 
deemed abandoned).     
 When Congress was considering legislation in the late 
1980s that would have required the Federal Government to 
transfer unclaimed money obtained from various sources — 
including savings bonds — to the states, the General Accounting 
Office estimated that tracking owners of such property would 
cost over $23 million.
27
  See app. at 185.  Although the States 
assert that they will not seek to enforce civil and criminal 
penalties in the event the Federal Government fails to comply 
with their respective acts, even if future State officials adhere to 
this policy, the fact remains that forcing the Federal Government 
                                                 
27
 We are not drawing any inference with respect to the issues in 
this case from the fact that Congress did not adopt that bill. 
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to account to the plaintiff States for unredeemed savings bonds 
or their proceeds — regardless of how stringently the States 
decide to enforce the reporting requirements contained in their 
respective acts — would result in a direct regulation of the 
Federal Government in contravention of the Supremacy Clause. 
 This result is not permissible.    
 C. The Tenth Amendment 
 The Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”  The States argue that the status 
quo amounts to a federal escheat of the proceeds from the 
unclaimed bonds, a process which they contend violates the 
Tenth Amendment because the Federal Government does not 
possess the escheat power, as it is a traditional prerogative of the 
states.  However, the funds at issue here have not been 
escheated to the Government and the Government does not seek 
to acquire them through escheat proceedings.  To the contrary 
the Government is holding the funds and will disburse them to 
the bondholders or their successors if they present the bonds for 
redemption.  Moreover, our result does not nullify state escheat 
laws for, as provided in the federal regulations and as 
recognized by the Treasury, third parties, including the States, 
may obtain ownership of the bonds — and consequently the 
right to redemption — through “valid[] judicial proceedings,” 31 
C.F.R. § 315.20(b), so long as they submit certified copies of the 
judgment or order affecting ownership and other evidence that 
may be necessary to support the validity of the judgment or 
order.  See 31 C.F.R. § 315.23.  The Government through its 
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issuance of the Escheat Decision admits as much.  Here, 
however, the States merely seek custody of, not title to, the 
funds at issue under their unclaimed property acts.
28
   
 In considering the States‟ Tenth Amendment contentions 
it is important to remember that the Government administers the 
savings bond program pursuant to the federal constitutional 
power “[t]o borrow money on the credit of the United States.”  
Free, 369 U.S. at 666-67, 82 S.Ct. at 1092.  Pursuant to this 
power, 31 U.S.C. §  3105(b)(2)(A) authorizes the Secretary of 
the Treasury to “prescribe regulations providing that . . . owners 
of savings bonds may keep the bonds after maturity or after a 
period beyond maturity.”  “If Congress acts under one of its 
                                                 
28
 We hasten to add that while in concluding that the State 
custody-based unclaimed property acts are preempted we are 
distinguishing, as does the Government itself, those acts from 
title-based acts, we do not imply that our result would be 
different if, confronted with a judgment of escheat under a title-
based escheat act, the Government abandoned its long held 
position as reflected in the Escheat Decision and refused to 
recognize the enforceability of the judgment with respect to 
savings bonds or their proceeds.  We simply are not faced with 
that possibility and thus we do not address it.  We merely are 
ruling on the basis of the legal picture as the Government 
presently sees it.  Furthermore, we neither are agreeing nor 
disagreeing with the States with respect to their contention that 
the Federal Government does not have escheat power.  We see 
no need to pass on this contention as the Federal Government is 
not seeking to escheat the proceeds of matured but unredeemed 
bonds. 
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enumerated powers . . . there can be no violation of the Tenth 
Amendment.”  United States v. Parker, 108 F.3d 28, 31 (3d Cir. 
1997) (quoting United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787, 791 (9th 
Cir. 1996)).  Accordingly, the States‟ Tenth Amendment claim 
must fail. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Though the United States pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 702 has 
waived its sovereign immunity from suit in this case, we do not 
find any merit in any of the States‟ claims.  Therefore, we will 
affirm the District Court‟s February 5, 2010 order dismissing the 
action under Rule 12(b)(6).  
